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Judicial Treatment of Aboriginal Peoples’ Oral History
Evidence: More Room for Reconciliation
[Winner of 2019 Tory Legal Writing Prize]

Jimmy Peterson

Jimmy Peterson*

Judicial Treatment of Aboriginal Peoples’
Oral History Evidence: More Room for
Reconciliation

Oral history is the only past record in many Aboriginal groups in Canada. In 1997,
in Delgamuukw, the Supreme Court of Canada recognized that the strict approach
to evidence law with respect to oral history had to be relaxed for Aboriginal
peoples to be able to pursue claims to Aboriginal rights or Aboriginal title. This
was a necessary element of the attempt to achieve reconciliation between
Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal peoples. Yet, while evidence law has become
increasingly nexible when it comes to accommodating Aboriginal peoples, courts
have struggled with how to value oral traditions. A review of the case law since
Delgamuukw reveals that courts typically mnd oral testimony evidence admissible
but give it little weight. They tend to favour written records when they connict with
oral testimony evidence. The Eurocentric preference towards written records is
undermining the potential for reconciliation.

L’histoire orale est la seule consignation du passé pour de nombreux groupes
autochtones au Canada. En 1997, dans l’arrêt Delgamuukw, la Cour suprême
du Canada a reconnu que l’approche stricte du droit de la preuve en matière
d’histoire orale devait être assouplie pour que les peuples autochtones puissent
revendiquer les droits ancestraux ou le titre autochtone. Il s’agissait là d’un
élément nécessaire pour l’effort de réconciliation entre les Autochtones et les nonAutochtones. Pourtant, bien que le droit de la preuve soit devenu de plus en plus
souple lorsqu’il s’agit d’accommoder les peuples autochtones, les tribunaux ont
eu de la difmculté à apprécier les traditions orales. Un examen de la jurisprudence
depuis l’arrêt Delgamuukw révèle que les tribunaux jugent généralement que les
témoignages oraux sont admissibles, mais qu’ils leur accordent peu de poids. Ils
ont tendance à favoriser les documents écrits lorsqu’ils entrent en connit avec les
témoignages oraux. La préférence eurocentrique pour les documents écrits mine
le potentiel de réconciliation.

*
This paper was awarded ¿rst prize for the 2019 J.S.D. Tory Award for legal writing. The author
thanks Schulich School of Law at Dalhousie University Law Professor, Adelina Iftene, for her
contributions to, feedback on, and encouragement to write this paper.
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Introduction: the place of oral history in evidence law
, The case-by-case approach to admitting Aboriginal peoples’ oral
histories as evidence
,, Positive developments in subsequent case law applying Aboriginal
peoples’ oral histories as evidence
 Courts have af¿rmed that Aboriginal oral testimony should
be accommodated and given due weight without requiring
corroborating external evidence
 Courts have emphasized that Aboriginal peoples’ oral
testimonies must be respected to be able to hold federal and
provincial governments accountable in Aboriginal rights cases
 The process for admission of oral history evidence in Aboriginal
title cases is more informal and a voir dire is not required
,,, The limits to acceptance of Aboriginal peoples’ oral history evidence
 Aboriginal peoples’ oral histories are more likely to be
admissible when the opposing party does not provide
contradictory documentary evidence
 Oral evidence is admissible to prove genealogy, but is not given
much weight
 Courts struggle with how much weight to give oral testimony
 Written records often convince courts more than oral evidence
does
,9 Courts are doing a mixed job of incorporating oral testimonial
evidence within the legal system
9 Aboriginal peoples’ oral story evidence is reliable and authentic like
written documents
Conclusion: greater acceptance of oral history evidence is fundamenal to
reconciliation

Introduction: the place of oral history in evidence law
'RFXPHQWV DUH WKH PRVW FRPPRQ W\SH RI UHDO HYLGHQFH 7KH UXOH
HVWDEOLVKHG LQ WKH V JRYHUQLQJ GRFXPHQWV ZDV WKH ³EHVW HYLGHQFH
UXOH´ZKLFKUHTXLUHGWKDWRQO\WKHEHVWHYLGHQFHDYDLODEOHIRUDSDUWLFXODU
IDFWEHDGPLVVLEOHLQFRXUW,WZDVFUHDWHGWRDYRLGSRVVLEOHHUURUVDVD
 5RQ 'HOLVOH HW DO Evidence: Principles and Problems WK HG 7RURQWR 7KRPVRQ 5HXWHUV
 DW
 &(' WK RQOLQH  Evidence ³'RFXPHQWDU\ (YLGHQFH %HVW (YLGHQFH 5XOH ,QWURGXFWLRQ´
9,,, D DW
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result of copying or oral stories. The rationale was that if the wording of
a document is changed either by accident or design, its meaning may be
fundamentally altered.3
However, the best evidence rule has declined in importance over time,
particularly relative to the overarching principle that all relevant evidence
should be admitted.4 In R v Betterest, the BC Court of Appeal stated that
an “over-technical and strained application of the best evidence rule serves
only to hamper the inquiry without at all advancing the cause of truth.”5
Today, the only vestige of the rule is that the original document must be
produced if it is available.6
Part of this Àexibility has been spurred by access to justice concerns in
the Aboriginal rights context.7 Until recently, oral history (or oral tradition)
was not accepted as evidence by Canadian courts. This effectively barred
Aboriginal title claims because oral stories are the only past records
in many Aboriginal groups.8 Oral traditions serve as a “repository of
historical knowledge” and express cultural values.9 They are usually
maintained by community elders who are the most respected members of
Aboriginal communities. Thus, oral stories are authoritative in Aboriginal
societies. Oral histories are passed down from generation to generation
and are validated by each generation.
In 1997, in Delgamuukw, the Supreme Court of Canada (“SCC”)
recognized that oral history should be accommodated and placed on an
“equal footing” with documents.10 To enable Aboriginal peoples to be able
to pursue claims under the Constitution Act, 1982, s 35(1), a strict approach
to evidence law had to be relaxed.11 The SCC realized that oral history has
features that would undermine its admissibility and weight if the SCC took
a traditional approach to evidence law. Typically, evidentiary principles
3.
David M Paciocco & Lee Stuesser, The Law of Evidence, 7th ed (Toronto: Irwin Law Inc, 2015)
at 502.
4.
CED, supra note 2 at § 419.
5.
R v Betterest Vinyl Manufacturing Ltd et al (1990), 52 CCC (3d) 441 at 448, [1990] 2 WWR 751
(BCCA), Taggart J, citing United States v Manton, 107 F (2d) 834 at 845 (2nd Cir 1938).
6.
Paciocco, supra note 3 at 502.
7.
Ibid at 10.
8.
CED 4th (online), Aboriginal Law, “The Canadian Legal Framework: Constitutional Protection
for Aboriginal Peoples: Section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982: Aboriginal Rights: Proof of
Aboriginal Rights: Evidentiary Issues” (II.5.(a).(ii).B.4) at § 317.
9.
Clay McLeod, “The Oral Histories of Canada’s Northern People, Anglo-Canadian Evidence
Law, and Canada’s Fiduciary Duty to First Nations: Breaking Down the Barriers of the Past” (1992)
30:4 Alta L Rev 1276 at 1279.
10. Delgamuukw v British Columbia, [1997] 3 SCR 1010 at para 87, 153 DLR (4th) 193
[Delgamuukw].
11. Ibid at para 84; Jack Woodward, Native Law (Toronto: Thomson Reuters, 1989) (loose-leaf
revision 2018-6), ch 2, s 260 at 2-11.
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dictate that second-hand information, which cannot be checked for its
accuracy, is inadmissible because it is unreliable as hearsay. The fact that
oral history is predominantly comprised of out-of-court statements would
generally make it hearsay. Moreover, because history, legend, politics,
and morals are woven into oral tradition, it would ordinarily be viewed as
tangential to determining the historical truth in evidence law. This would
render oral history inadmissible or, if it was ruled admissible, it would
be given little weight, which is the amount of emphasis granted to the
evidence by the court. Overall, the SCC appreciated that reconciliation
could not be achieved without a more purposive approach.
Reconciliation aims to establish a mutually respectful long-term
relationship between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal peoples.12 In its 2015
Final Report, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission stated that this
includes the rejection of racist and paternalistic attitudes.13 It also means
acknowledging the harmful impacts that residential schools and other
colonial tools (violent and non-violent) have had. Reconciliation must
be transformative and comprehensive, touching on virtually every aspect
of Canadian life. The Report notes that a more Àexible and purposive
approach to Aboriginal peoples’ oral stories is one component of this
reconciliation.14
This paper ¿rst outlines the foundational cases that allowed for the
use of oral evidence in Aboriginal rights claims. Then, it examines how
subsequent courts have treated oral evidence and whether evidence law
has been suf¿ciently Àexible to help achieve the promise of reconciliation
under the Constitution Act, s 35(1).
In evidence law, a document must be genuine in that the item
tendered as an exhibit is authenticated to be what it is represented to be
by its proponent.15 Courts, such as Wilder and Hirsch, have con¿rmed
that authentication is a low threshold requiring only minimal evidence.16
Weakness in authenticity should generally go to weight, not admissibility.
Yet, while evidence law has become increasingly Àexible when it
comes to accommodating Aboriginal peoples, courts have struggled
with how to value oral traditions. A review of the case law reveals that
courts typically ¿nd oral testimony evidence admissible but give it little
12. Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, Honouring the Truth, Reconciling for the
Future: Summary of the Final Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, vol 1
(Winnipeg: TRC, 2015) at 6.
13. Ibid at vi.
14. Ibid at 18.
15. Delisle, supra note 1 at 811.
16. R v Wilder, 2002 BCSC 1333 at para 288 [Wilder]; R v Hirsch, 2017 SKCA 14 at para 18
[Hirsch].
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weight. They tend to favour written records when they conÀict with oral
testimony evidence. The Eurocentric preference towards written records is
undermining the potential for reconciliation.
I.

The case-by-case approach to admitting Aboriginal peoples’ oral
histories as evidence
Even prior to Delgamuukw, judges’ understanding of oral history had been
raised by academics and courts.17 For example, in 1985 in Simon, Chief
Justice Dickson overturned Syliboy18 where the Court had held that the
Cape Breton First Nations band did not have the capacity to enter into
an enforceable treaty with the Governor.19 Chief Justice Dickson noted
that the language in Syliboy reÀected the biases and prejudices of an old
era that were no longer acceptable and was “inconsistent with a growing
sensitivity to native rights in Canada.”20 He held that the Micmacs’ oral
history was admissible under the reputation exception to the hearsay rule.
It met the requirements of necessity and reliability given that the “Micmacs
did not keep written records. Micmac traditions are largely oral in nature.
To impose an impossible burden of proof would, in effect, render nugatory
any right.”21 Oral history therefore was admissible as hearsay evidence.22
Moreover, in 1996 in Van der Peet, a Sto:Lo First Nation member
had been convicted of selling ten salmon without a licence and defended
that she was exercising her Aboriginal right to ¿sh based on oral history.23
Chief Justice Lamer emphasized that courts must not undervalue oral
evidence simply because it does not conform precisely with evidentiary
standards that would typically be applied in a private tort law case.24 Oral
evidence should be approached with a “consciousness of the special nature
of aboriginal claims.”25
Nevertheless, in Delgamuukw, Chief Justice Lamer highlighted the
dif¿culties with oral histories: “they are tangential to the ultimate purpose
of the fact-¿nding process at trial” and they “largely consist of out-of-court
statements, passed on through an unbroken chain across the generations,”

17. Mary Locke Macaulay, Aboriginal & Treaty Rights Practice (Toronto: Thomson Reuters, 2000)
(loose-leaf revision 2018-2), ch 9.2(c)(i) at 9-8.
18. Rex v Syliboy, [1929] 1 DLR 307, 50 CCC 389 (NS Co Ct) [Syliboy].
19. Simon v The Queen, [1985] 2 SCR 387 at 400-401, 24 DLR (4th) 390.
20. Ibid at 399.
21. Ibid at 408.
22. Macaulay, supra note 17 at ch 9.4(b) at 9-21.
23. R v Van der Peet, [1996] 2 SCR 507, 137 DLR (4th) 289 [Van der Peet].
24. Shin Imai, Annotated Aboriginal Law: The Constitution, Legislation, Treaties and Supreme
Court of Canada Case Summaries: 2019 (Toronto: Thomson Reuters, 2018) at 967.
25. Van der Peet, supra note 23 at para 68.
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which conÀicts with the general rule against the admissibility of hearsay.26
Consequently, their admissibility is assessed on a case-by-case basis.27
In 2001, 0LWFKHOO expanded on 'HOJDPXXNZ and established a 3-part
admissibility test for oral history: ¿rst, it must be useful to prove a relevant
fact; second, it is reasonably reliable; and third, its probative value is not
overshadowed by its prejudicial effects.28 0LWFKHOO af¿rmed the case-bycase approach noting that this did not “mandate the blanket admissibility
of such evidence or the weight it should be accorded by the trier of fact.”29
Oral history must be useful and reasonably reliable but is still subject
to the exclusionary discretion of the trial judge. To be useful to prove a
relevant fact, it should be the only available evidence on point and provide
the Aboriginal perspective on the right claimed.30 Further, the evidence
will be reliable if the witness represents a reasonably reliable source of the
particular people’s history.31
While Chief Justice McLachlin in 0LWFKHOO noted that the Western
Eurocentric mindset against mythology, imprecise detail, and tangential
material should not be used to discount oral histories as unreliable or
unhelpful,32 she emphasized that the fundamental principles of evidence
law and common sense should not be disregarded.33 There must be
persuasive evidence brought by the Aboriginal group to demonstrate the
validity of oral history on the balance of probabilities without arti¿cially
inÀating the weight of such evidence: “Placing ‘due weight’ on the
aboriginal perspective, or ensuring its supporting evidence an ‘equal
footing’ with more familiar forms of evidence, means precisely what these
phrases suggest: HTXDO and GXH treatment.”34
Overall, subsequent case law reveals that this case-by-case evidentiary
approach to Aboriginal peoples’ oral histories poses problems at two stages:
admissibility and weight. There are concerns about authenticity, hearsay,
and reliability. Judges have really struggled with the amount of weight
that should be afforded to oral evidence, especially when it conÀicts with
written records. Some courts do not view oral testimony as having “precise
historical accuracy.”35 They sometimes factor into their decisions whether
26. 'HOJDPXXNZ,VXSUD note 10 at para 86.
27. ,ELG at para 87.
28. 0LWFKHOOY015, 2001 SCC 33 at para 30 [0LWFKHOO].
29. ,ELG at para 31.
30. ,ELG at para 32.
31. ,ELG at para 33.
32. ,ELG at para 34.
33. ,ELGat para 38.
34. ,ELG at para 39 [emphasis in original].
35. 6TXDPLVK,QGLDQ%DQGY5, 2001 FCT 480, 100 ACWS (3d) 520, Simpson J [6TXDPLVK].
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there is external corroborating evidence and emphasize that Aboriginal
communities’ oral stories are passed down informally without “proper”
checks and balances.36 Although oral history is supposed to be on an equal
footing with documents, it is not at either stage of admissibility or weight.
Because most Aboriginal groups have no written records, the failure of
courts to place oral history on an equal footing creates an unworkable
standard of proof for Aboriginal peoples. The effect is to render Aboriginal
rights as meaningless and therefore frustrate attempts at reconciliation.
II. Positive developments in subsequent case law applying Aboriginal
peoples’ oral histories as evidence
1. Courts have af¿rmed that Aboriginal oral testimony should
be accommodated and given due weight without requiring
corroborating external evidence
In Tsilhqot’in, Justice Vickers discussed the history of oral stories as
evidence in Canadian courts and how early case law did little to enhance
Aboriginal peoples’ trust within the legal system.37 Chief William testi¿ed
in the case that oral traditions are vital to Tsilhqot’in society, as the stories
are told and retold at camps, gatherings, and at home.38 Justice Vickers
noted that many of the oral traditions he heard were woven with history,
legend, politics, and moral obligations, presented a “marked departure
from court’s usual fare and [posed] a challenge to the evaluation of the
entire body of evidence.”39 He stated that the objective truth was more
elusive with oral evidence. He accepted an anthropologist, Jan Vansina, as
an expert on oral tradition as well as an anthropologist and ethnohistorian,
Dr. von Gernet. Justice Vickers accepted Vansina’s testimony that oral
stories should be viewed as hypotheses given that they change through
transmission.40 That being said, Justice Vickers found that Dr. von Gernet
was wrongly inclined to give no weight to oral tradition evidence without
corroborating evidence from an outside source. Justice Vickers af¿rmed
that the “goal of reconciliation can only be achieved if oral tradition
evidence is placed on an equal footing with historical documents.”41
Conversely, the plaintiff’s expert, John Dewhirst, a cultural
anthropologist, correctly gave oral testimony independent weight.42 Justice
36. Canada v Benoit, 2003 FCA 236, leave to appeal to SCC refused, [2003] SCCA No 387 [Benoit].
37. Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Columbia, 2007 BCSC 1700, aff’d on other grounds 2012 BCCA
285, rev’d on other grounds 2014 SCC 44 [Tsilhqot’in].
38. Ibid at para 145.
39. Ibid at para 137.
40. Ibid at para 147.
41. Ibid at para 152.
42. Ibid at para 159.
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Vickers emphasized Dewhirst’s ¿ndings that the Tsilhqot’in method of
oral transmission reÀects their non-hierarchical society with no formally
recognized experts. This informality did not detract from the weight of
the oral testimony.43 Justice Vickers concluded that the Lhin Desch’osh, a
central Tsilhqot’in myth, demonstrated the Tsilhqot’in people’s territorial
familiarity with the land prior to European contact.44 He admitted all of the
evidence, as it remained consistent.45 He noted that he would consider it
from the Aboriginal peoples’ perspective, but that if it was insuf¿cient on
its own to reach a conclusion of fact, anthropological, archeological, and
other documentary evidence would be necessary to corroborate it. In the
end, Justice Vickers did not make a declaration of Aboriginal title, but he
did ¿nd that title existed in large portions of the claimed territory and that
the Tsilhqot’in had rights to hunt and trap that were infringed unjusti¿ably
by the province.
In Jacobs, Justice Macaulay found that the Customs Act࣠46 and the
Excise Act࣠47 did not exhibit a clear and plain intent to extinguish the
Aboriginal right to obtain tobacco for uses integral to Sto:lo society.48
The Sto:lo elders claimed that they had an unextinguished right to trade
goods, including tobacco, across the Canadian border without conforming
with customs regulations.49 Their oral testimony was that tobacco use and
trade were central to the band’s culture and traditions before European
contact. Justice Macaulay highlighted the signi¿cant limitations of oral
history including reliability concerns about recollection of information
obtained and observed many decades ago, and European cultural and
legal inÀuences that came into play post-contact and altered or obliterated
aspects of pre-contact culture.50
However, Justice Macaulay was persuaded by the oral testimony and
stressed that it must be accommodated and given due weight without
applying evidentiary principles too strictly.51 He highlighted that it was
legitimated through the process of “oral footnoting” wherein there must be
respect accorded by the community to elder speakers and their lineage back
to the story’s source.52 The community controlled for the stories’ accuracy
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Ibid at para 167.
Ibid at para 175.
Ibid at para 196.
Customs Act, RSC 1985, c 1.
Excise Act, RSC 1985, c E-14.
R v Jacobs, [1999] 3 CNLR 239 at para 110, [1998] BCJ No 3144 (SC) [Jacobs].
Macaulay, supra note 17 at ch 9.4(d)(iv) at 9-37.
Jacobs, supra note 48 at para 9.
Ibid at para 84.
Ibid at para 57.
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by not inviting a speaker back at a future public gathering if he or she did
not provide proper footnoting. Justice Macaulay noted that the legends
were accurate, as grandparents passed them on to their grandchildren, with
the telling of the story stopping after the child fell asleep and continuing
the following night until the child could recall the story comprehensively.53
In Callihoo, Justice Hillier dismissed the Crown’s motion to strike
the pleadings based on a lack of documentary evidence.54 The Aboriginal
plaintiffs claimed that their treaty and Charter rights were violated. Justice
Hillier held that the lack of documentary evidence was not fatal to an
Aboriginal claim where oral testimony was relied on to prove that the
plaintiffs had an unbroken ancestry.55 He cited Delgamuukw and Mitchell
for the principle that: “oral history may be important to enable the
Court to reach conclusions about the intentions of the Indians.”56 Justice
Hillier highlighted the importance of revealing the Aboriginal context to
documentary and oral history. Respect for the Aboriginal perspective is
critical to reconciliation.
These cases demonstrate that courts are being more Àexible when
it comes to Aboriginal peoples’ oral evidence within evidence law. Oral
stories do not require corroborating documents. There is a recognition that
there are checks and balances within Aboriginal groups with respect to the
reliability of oral stories, as the stories are told constantly and checked for
accuracy at public gatherings. This Àexibility is what the SCC intended
when it spoke to placing Aboriginal peoples’ oral history evidence on
an “equal footing” with documents in Delgamuukw in order to take
meaningful steps towards reconciliation.
2. Courts have emphasized that Aboriginal peoples’ oral testimonies
must be respected to be able to hold federal and provincial
governments accountable in Aboriginal rights cases
In Wesley, the issue was whether historical facts were the unique province
of historical experts in an Aboriginal rights case.57 Canada’s representative
was examined, but Canada objected to questions put to him on the basis that
the questions required speculative interpretation of a document. Canada
and Alberta contended that the questions would require the representative
to “speak about history beyond living memory and to provide what they
maintain is an opinion on historical matters, the latter within the sole

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Ibid at para 58.
Callihoo v Canada (Indian Affairs and Northern Development), 2003 ABQB 1044 [Callihoo].
Woodward, supra note 11, at ch 20.4(b.1) at 402.16.
Callihoo, supra note 54 at para 31.
Wesley First Nation v Alberta, 2015 ABCA 76 [Wesley].
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province of an expert.”58 However, the Court emphasized that the rules
of evidence are relaxed for Aboriginal rights cases following Mitchell.59
The Court held that a lay or government representative can be questioned
about historical documents.60 It reasoned that “since most aboriginal
law cases present broad historical aspects, to adopt [the government’s]
position would effectively render oral discoveries useless in cases dealing
with aboriginal rights and treaty rights.”61
In Ahousaht, there was a voir dire on the admissibility of oral
evidence.62 Canada defended that the plaintiffs’ witness, Victoria Wells,
who gave oral evidence was unreliable because she could not identify the
source of each piece of information she testi¿ed to and because of how
she educated herself in the Ehattesaht history, culture, and traditions.63
Wells was the band manager of the Ehattesaht First Nation in the 1990s
but had picked up knowledge from her previous schooling in Vancouver
and from books that she had read. Justice Garson found her oral testimony
admissible, as the “fact that some living people contributed to her general
knowledge does not…render inadmissible all her knowledge where she
cannot attribute certain knowledge to one particular source.”64 Justice
Garson concluded that these concerns were more appropriately focused
on weight, not admissibility. Thus, Justice Garson did not view written
sources of information as tainting the reliability of knowledge gained
through oral sources.
This line of cases properly treats Aboriginal peoples’ oral stories as
historical documents. In doing so, the courts hold the federal and provincial
governments more accountable in Aboriginal and treaty rights cases. The
witness’s testimony needs only be reasonably reliable pursuant to Mitchell.
Further, this is consistent with Hirsch in that concerns about the source
of the oral testimonial evidence should go to weight, not admissibility.
Authentication should remain a low threshold requiring only minimal
evidence, as it does in the case of written historical documents. Lastly,
these cases are realistic in recognizing that there has been substantial
interaction between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal peoples but that this
does not undermine the reliability of the Aboriginal peoples’ perspective.

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Ibid at para 10.
Ibid at para 9.
Imai, supra note 24 at 968.
Wesley, supra note 57 at para 12.
The Ahousaht v Canada (AG), 2008 BCSC 769 [Ahousaht].
Ibid at para 11.
Ibid at para 17.

Judicial Treatment of Aboriginal Peoples’ Oral History
Evidence: More Room for Reconciliation

493

3. The process for admission of oral history evidence in Aboriginal title
cases is more informal and a voir dire is not required
In William, the defendants objected to the admission of Tsilhqot’in and
Xeni Gwet’in oral history evidence in an Aboriginal rights and title
claim without a process that would inquire into their admissibility and
reliability.65 The oral stories related to genealogy, past practices, and
customs. Justice Vickers rejected BC’s application to have a voir dire to
determine the evidence’s admissibility.66 He emphasized the plaintiff’s
af¿davit evidence of John Dewhirst, an anthropologist and archaeologist,
and was persuaded by Dewhirst’s evidence that the Tsilhqot’in people are
reluctant to give oral history unless they are con¿dent they can accurately
recount the event.67 Justice Vickers noted that trial judges have discretion
to order inquiries into the reliability of the witness.68 He substituted an
informal process wherein the court could test reliability in order to more
effectively pursue the promise of reconciliation under the Constitution
Act, 1982, s 35(1).69 This would involve a preliminary examination of the
witness regarding70:
(a) Personal information concerning the attributes of the witness
relating to his or her ability to recount hearsay evidence of oral
history, practices, events, customs or traditions.
(b) In a general way, evidence of the sources of the witness, his or
her relationship to those sources and the general reputation of the
source.
(c) Any other information that might bear on the issue of reliability.
Justice Vickers continued that this would not be an “elaborate”
procedure.71 He concluded that the weight of such oral testimonial
evidence can always be debated in closing arguments. His approach is
generally consistent with how documents are authenticated and that
questions regarding authenticity can always be brought forward at the
next stage of weighing the evidence. Justice Vickers’ decision is important
for reconciliation purposes because a more informal process to test the
reliability of oral history can make such evidence more commonplace
and acceptable. By not distinguishing oral tradition evidence from other
hearsay evidence so formally, courts can make the notion of oral history

65. William et al v British Columbia et al, 2004 BCSC 148 [William].
66. Woodward, supra note 11, at ch 20.4(b.1) at 402.16.
67. William, supra note 65 at paras 7-9.
68. Ibid at para 10.
69. Ibid at para 16.
70. Ibid at para 28.
71. Ibid at para 29.
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evidence in the legal system a less “foreign” idea. Justice Vickers’
approach to analyzing oral history for necessity and reliability is similar to
the procedures in other cases involving non-Aboriginal peoples’ evidence.
This consistency establishes oral history as having more of an equal
footing with written documents, which in turn promotes reconciliation.
III. The limits to acceptance of Aboriginal peoples’ oral history evidence
1. Aboriginal peoples’ oral histories are more likely to be admissible
when the opposing party does not provide contradictory
documentary evidence
In Sappier, Justice Bastarache held that an Aboriginal right to harvest
wood for domestic uses on Crown lands by the Pabineau Nation existed.72
A Mi’kmaq elder and historian, Mr. Sewell, had been declared an expert
by the trial judge on oral customs passed down through generations on the
issue of gathering wood by Mi’kmaq on the lands. Mr. Sewell concluded
that “[s]o, as far back as I can read in history or the oral tradition that has
been passed down to me, it’s been—we’ve been always gathering and
we’ve been always using wood as, as, as a way of life.”73 His evidence
detailed the many uses to which wood was put by the Mi’kmaq. This was
proof that harvesting wood for domestic uses was integral to the Mi’kmaq’s
pre-contact way of life. Justice Bastarache emphasized multiple times
that Mr. Sewell’s evidence was not contradicted by the Crown on crossexamination or by other documentary evidence.74 The problem with this
type of reasoning is that it discredits oral history evidence to an extent
because it implies that had contradictory documentary evidence been
presented, the oral history is much less likely to be found admissible. The
analysis maintains a Eurocentric perspective on evidence, which mitigates
the potential for reconciliation to be transformative and comprehensive.
2. Oral evidence is admissible to prove genealogy, but is not given
much weight
Courts have typically allowed Aboriginal parties to use oral evidence
to prove genealogy.75 In Wilson, Justice Sigurdson cited Delgamuukw
for the principle that oral histories should not be undervalued.76 The
appellant applied to be registered as an Indian under the Indian Act,77 and
72. R v Sappier; R v Gray, 2006 SCC 54 at para 53 [Sappier].
73. Ibid at para 31.
74. Ibid at paras 15, 29.
75. Macauley, supra note 17 at ch 9.4(d)(i) at 9-29.
76. Wilson v Indian Registry (Registrar) (1999), 71 BCLR (3d) 145 at para 29, 92 ACWS (3d) 556
(SC) [Wilson].
77. Indian Act, RSC 1985, c I-5 [Indian Act].
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presented oral history concerning his paternal heritage. Justice Sigurdson
held that a registrar of the Indian Registry should not require independent
con¿rmation of oral history evidence pertaining to relevant historical
facts before giving it weight. Therefore, the registrar erred because she
had required independent corroboration of the applicant’s oral history
evidence showing that his great-great-grandfather lived and died in the
area of the Penelakut Tribe.78 The matter was remitted for reconsideration.
Although generally admissible to prove genealogy, oral stories may
not be given much weight. In 6QDNH, Justice Gibson highlighted that the
evidentiary concerns about Aboriginal oral stories from 'HOJDPXXNZ and
0LWFKHOO applied to both admissibility and weight.79 He admitted most of the
plaintiffs’ oral history evidence regarding ancestry as reliable, particularly
where he had the opportunity to observe the witness’s demeanour in
testimony.80 However, the testimony of one witness was not admissible.
Justice Gibson found that witness’s evidence unreliable because he learned
much of the information about family history from an elderly historian,
who was not before the court and could not be evaluated.81 Overall, little
weight was attributed to the admitted oral testimonies and the plaintiffs
failed to show that they were direct descendants in unbroken lines of Band
members. Justice Gibson distinguished 'HOJDPXXNZ because “precise
historical accuracy” was important whereas in 'HOJDPXXNZ it was about
broad and general considerations.82 The problem with this distinction is that
it makes oral history a type of second-class evidence. Unlike with written
documents, oral history evidence has value only in limited contexts, which
frustrates the objective of reconciliation.
3. &RXUWVVWUXJJOHZLWKKRZPXFKZHLJKWWRJLYHRUDOWHVWLPRQ\
In ,URQHDJOH, the Aboriginal defendants were charged with marketing
¿sh.83 Much of their defence was based on oral history. Justice Moxley
noted that while such evidence is routinely accepted as admissible and as
an exception to the hearsay rule, judges struggle with how much weight to
attribute to it.84 He decided that the oral evidence at hand was admissible,
but that it should not be given any weight. Justice Moxley noted that a party
seeking to rely on oral testimony evidence must show that the witnesses

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

:LOVRQVXSUDnote 76 at para 48.
6QDNHY7KH4XHHQ, 2001 FCT 858 at para 54, 209 FTR 211.
,ELG at para 57.
,ELG at para 58.
,ELG at paras 51-52.
5Y,URQHDJOH (1999), 186 Sask R 131, [2000] 2 CNLR 163 (PC) [,URQHDJOH].
,ELG at para 3.
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providing it are members of a culture that kept no written history.85 He
continued that the evidence must raise facts that are sought to be proven,
rather than being simple anecdotes.86 The defendant needed to raise more
speci¿c evidence regarding the Pasqua Cree for the judge to ¿nd that the
Pasqua Lake was part of the Pasqua Reserve.87
In 6TXDPLVK, the plaintiff Squamish, Musqueam, and Burrard bands
alleged that the federal government breached its ¿duciary duty to them by
improperly allocating a property on its reserve, mismanaging the reserve,
and surrendering the reserve when it should have been leased over the long
term.88 Justice Simpson distinguished the Aboriginal and treaty cases like
'HOJDPXXNZ, where broad questions covering a long time period were at
issue, compared to the case at hand where factual determinations had to
be made about events at speci¿c periods of time.89 She found that the oral
evidence was directed at precise historical truths at given dates and places,
it was not the only available evidence on the issue, and it was sometimes
contradictory.90 Consequently, because precise historical accuracy was at
issue on narrow, speci¿c questions, the weight given to the oral testimony
was reduced. Furthermore, Justice Simpson noted that in determining oral
testimony evidence, several factors should be considered: competing oral
history, documentary evidence, any external corroboration, the source of
the information, and changes that could have distorted the evidence.91
Here, there are cracks in the application of the 0LWFKHOO test. The
courts are being very strenuous on the reasonable reliability component
of admissibility, especially in genealogy cases. Courts are also giving oral
testimonial evidence lesser weight than other documents because they
believe they lack precise historical accuracy. Justice Gibson’s and Justice
Simpson’s distinction that the oral evidence in 'HOJDPXXNZ was merely
for broader general purposes related to Aboriginal rights undermines the
value of oral history in other contexts. Courts can simply reframe their
cases as requiring precise historical accuracy to minimize the weight
of Aboriginal peoples’ oral history evidence. Moreover, allocating zero
weight to Aboriginal peoples’ oral testimony, as Justice Moxley did in
,URQHDJOH, makes the evidence meaningless and GH IDFWR inadmissible.
Increased judicial training on oral history and the appointment of more

85.
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87.
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89.
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Woodward, VXSUD note 11, at ch 20.4(b.1) at 402.15.
,URQHDJOH VXSUD note 83 at para 10.
,ELG at para 11.
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independent experts could help judges to overcome these Eurocentric
biases. Greater education of lawyers through provincial law societies may
also assist courts to appreciate the value of oral history in the reconciliation
process.
4. :ULWWHQUHFRUGVRIWHQFRQYLQFHFRXUWVPRUHWKDQRUDOHYLGHQFHGRHV
In 0DUVKDOO, Justice Curran found “the massive written record…far
more convincing than the minimal oral evidence.”92 Chief Augustine,
an Aboriginal history researcher and acting Curator of Eastern Maritime
Ethnology at the Canadian Museum of Civilization in Hull, Quebec, had
testi¿ed about Mi’kmaq oral tradition. Justice Curran found that he was
quali¿ed to testify. Chief Augustine testi¿ed about stories passed down to
him by his family, including one about an ancient connection between the
Mi’kmaq and their territory as well as the ancient roots of the seven districts
into which that territory is divided, passed on to him by his grandmother
when he was young. He told the story at Grand Council meetings.
Chief Augustine also testi¿ed that a wampum belt at the Vatican
Archives was a representation linking the Mi’kmaq with Christianity in
the early 1600s, but the Crown’s witness Dr. von Gernet found conclusive
evidence delinking the belt to Nova Scotia or the Mi’kmaq. As a result,
Justice Curran considered that error in weighing Chief Augustine’s other
evidence.93 Dr. von Gernet testi¿ed that Aboriginal peoples’ memories
are not biologically superior to those of non-Aboriginal peoples and that
there was a lack of training and group validation used by Chief Augustine
and the Mi’kmaq to improve the accuracy of the oral traditions. Justice
Curran then cited from 'HOJDPXXNZ that oral tradition was not better than
documentary evidence and that the smallest amount of oral tradition by
a single witness should not be accepted over a mountain of documentary
evidence.94 He also reasoned that he did not know whether Chief
Augustine’s testimony was inÀuenced by his own literacy or that of his
forebears compared to the 1700s British and French documents containing
no evidence of seven districts or a ground council.
In %HQRLW, Justice Nadon overturned the trial judge’s ¿nding that
oral traditions showed that the Cree and Dene peoples believed that a tax
exemption promise had been made by the Crown even though the treaty
was silent on taxation.95 Justice Nadon concluded that the hearsay nature
92. 5Y0DUVKDOO, 2001 NSPC 2 at para 65, [2001] 2 CNLR 256, aff’d on issue at 2005 SCC 43 at
paras 120-125.
93. ,ELG at para 61.
94. ,ELG at para 64.
95. %HQRLW, VXSUD note 36.
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of the oral evidence was unreliable. He reasoned that the trial judge had
crossed the line 0LWFKHOO warned about in being overly generous with oral
history and arti¿cially giving it more weight than it reasonably supports.96
He stressed that evidence creating suspicion, surmise, or conjecture is
insuf¿cient.97 Justice Nadon rejected the trial judge’s community standard
test to determine whether oral evidence is useful and reliable, and stated
that an objective standard must be used.98 The community’s perspective
can be a relevant factor, but not determinative. Justice Nadon stated that
the evidence was not reliable because it lacked the checks and balances
in 'HOJDPXXNZ where specially-appointed people at community events
told the oral stories and their authenticity was ensured because others
could object if the stories were told inaccurately.99 Here, the stories were
passed on informally from individual to individual. Moreover, Justice
Nadon quoted Dr. von Gernet, the Albertan anthropologist, who strongly
criticized the weight of Aboriginal oral stories because Aboriginal peoples
have no special memories compared to non-Aboriginal peoples.100
Thus, courts have signalled that they typically prefer written
documents over oral history. Aboriginal oral history evidence is more
likely to be ruled admissible and given more weight when the opposing
side does not contradict it with written documentary evidence. However,
when conÀicting written documents are in evidence, oral history evidence
is given far less weight. The standard to assess the weight of oral evidence
also increases when there are conÀicting written documents.
Courts heed the warning from 'HOJDPXXNZ to not be overly generous
towards Aboriginal peoples’ oral evidence. But they have gone too far
in that direction. The low standard for authenticity is being raised with
respect to the reliability of the sources of oral histories. This has spilled
over too much into the weighing of such evidence. It has led some courts,
such as in %HQRLW, to follow experts like Dr. von Gernet who argue that
Aboriginal peoples’ oral history evidence is unreliable because it is too
informal. These were the exact stereotypes that 'HOJDPXXNZ tried to
break when placing Aboriginal peoples’ oral stories on an “equal footing”
with documents. These limitations on the use of oral history evidence are
unwarranted given its reliability and legitimacy. They mitigate the chances
for successful Aboriginal claimants, which hinders the commitment to
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reconcile Aboriginal peoples’ perspectives with non-Aboriginal peoples’
views in the legal system and the opportunity to move forward.
IV. Courts are doing a mixed job of incorporating oral testimonial
evidence within the legal system
There are mixed results in the case law after Delgamuukw. Courts
typically ¿nd that oral testimony evidence is admissible, but struggle with
what weight to give it. Oftentimes, as in Ironeagle, judges will confuse
the analyses and give little or no weight to such evidence because of
Eurocentric concerns about admissibility. In addition, courts can easily
frame cases as requiring precise historical accuracy, instead of broader
questions, in order to reduce the weight given to oral testimony as in
Squamish.
Furthermore, courts tend to favour written records when in conÀict
with oral testimony evidence. They are more likely to ¿nd oral testimonial
evidence admissible when there is no contradictory documentary evidence
presented, as in Sappier. Some judges even defer to anthropologists such
as Dr. von Gernet, in Benoit, who consistently testi¿es for the government
to the tune that Aboriginal peoples have no special memory capacities and
oral testimony requires independent corroboration.
University of Victoria Law Professor Val Napoleon contends that case
law involving evidence of oral histories to support Aboriginal rights claims
since Delgamuukw has varied widely.101 Napoleon argues that Benoit “is
a chilling example of the continuing problems encountered by aboriginal
claimants when tendering oral histories as evidence.”102 She posits that
case law has become increasingly restrictive since Delgamuukw on
accommodating Aboriginal oral histories and there has been no paradigm
shift in the treatment of oral histories.103
Since Napoleon’s critique that there has been no improvement since
Delgamuukw in her 2005 article, courts have routinely found Aboriginal
peoples’ oral history evidence as admissible. Although they do struggle
with weight, there have been numerous positive cases such as Tsilhqot’in,
Jacobs, Callihoo, Wesley, Ahousaht, and William.
In discussing oral history evidence, University of Victoria Law Professor
John Borrows argues that Delgamuukw’s caveat that reconciliation must
not be done in a manner that “strains the Canadian legal and constitutional

101. Val Napoleon, “Delgamuukw : A Legal Straightjacket for Oral Histories?” (2005) 20:2 CJLS 123
at 133.
102. Ibid at 133.
103. Ibid at 136-137.
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structure” creates a major challenge for Aboriginal peoples.104 This
rejects the potential for legal pluralism and creates challenges for later
courts applying 'HOJDPXXNZ’s evidentiary standard. Borrows contends
that the SCC’s test for oral evidence subordinates Aboriginal traditions
within the common law and constitutional regime, thereby not granting
it an equal footing. Oral traditions may not be respected because they are
often controversial in undermining the Canadian legal system’s claim to
legitimacy by shedding light on past unconscionable Crown behaviour.105
Misunderstanding also stems from fundamentally differing cultural
perceptions of space, time, historical truth, and causality.106 In addition,
the questioning of elders is often problematic because it is tantamount
to discrediting their reputation and standing in an Aboriginal community.
This would be akin to questioning judges in common law systems after
each of their decisions.107 Finally, there are few Aboriginal peoples within
positions of power and the court system, further hastening linguistic, legal,
and cultural differences.108
The importance of incorporating Aboriginal peoples’ oral stories as
evidence cannot be understated. In 'HOJDPXXNZ, the valuing of the “oral
over the written” was essential to recognizing that Canada is a country
“where there is more than one source for intellectual thought.”109 The
respect for oral stories as being equal to documents as evidence signalled the
existence of choice and legitimate legal systems beyond the old European
linear perspective. The founding part of Canada, Aboriginal peoples, have
every right to their own ways of imagining civilization and this fact can
help to reimagine the whole.110 Oral storytelling is not only a crucial means
for Aboriginal peoples to continue to build the relationship with nonAboriginal peoples, but it also preserves and refreshes oral history that
represents the communities’ institutional memory.111 Retelling is central
to all stories in Aboriginal communities, as stories take on their meaning
through retelling. They take much of their authority from the expression

104. John Borrows, 5HFRYHULQJ&DQDGD7KH5HVXUJHQFHRI,QGLJHQRXV/DZ (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 2002) at 87.
105. ,ELG at 88.
106. ,ELG at 90.
107. ,ELG at 91.
108. ,ELGat 92.
109. John Ralston Saul, “A Different Model of the Nation-State: Canada in the World and the
Aboriginal InÀuence” (2012) 75:1 Sask L Rev 3 at 9.
110. ,ELG at 10.
111. Kerry Wilkins, “Reasoning with the Elephant: The Crown, Its Counsel and Aboriginal Law in
Canada” (2015) 13:1 Indigenous LJ 27 at 62.
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of Aboriginal voices, not just the experience of Aboriginal peoples.112
As the Truth and Reconciliation Commission states, reconciliation is
fundamentally about mutual respect. Therefore, incorporating Aboriginal
peoples’ oral stories as evidence is essential to building this respect.
V. Aboriginal peoples’ oral story evidence is reliable and authentic like
written documents
The premise that documents generally have some scienti¿c basis is
debatable. Written records may not be any more objective or inherently
reliable than oral history.113 The meaning of written documents must
be understood in their context based on who wrote it, for whom, and
why.114 In fact, signi¿cant portions of documentary records began as oral
history.115 Written and oral history are both subject to revisions and changes
over time. These changes may not necessarily reÀect how interpretive
transmission occurred, but rather may be due to the social and cultural
context informing people who engage in such transmission.116 In fact, oral
traditions sometimes facilitate signi¿cant changes to the written record.117
Aboriginal oral history evidence is reliable and authentic. The risk of
error due to generational transmission is low. Oral tradition is premised on
fact, not imagination, and there is a fundamental necessity to accurately
recount oral stories within Aboriginal communities.118 Elders are the most
respected members of society. They are authoritative like judges in a
common law system. They carefully and deliberately pass on stories to
young children until the children know these stories verbatim.119 Moreover,
it is often the communities, not just individuals alone, that piece together
the stories in a comprehensive manner. These stories are told at ceremonial
gatherings and are consistently tested for their accuracy by community
members. Even in the Aboriginal groups without ceremonial gatherings,
the elders are very careful about how stories are passed on to their children
and grandchildren to remain accurate.
112. J Edward Chamberlin, “Culture and Anarchy in Indian Country” in Michael Asch, ed, Aboriginal
and Treaty Rights in Canada (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1997) 3 at 18.
113. Russell Binch, “‘Speaking for Themselves’ Historical Determinism and Cultural Relativity in
Sui Generis Aboriginal and Treaty Rights Litigation” (2002) 13:1 NJCL 245 at 258.
114. David Milward, “Doubting What the Elders Have to Say: A Critical Examination of Canadian
Judicial Treatment of Aboriginal Oral History Evidence” (2010) 14:4 Intl J Evidence & Proof 287 at
306.
115. John Borrows, “Listening for A Change: The Courts and Oral Tradition” (2001) 39:1 Osgoode
Hall LJ 1 at 15-16.
116. Ibid at 17.
117. Ibid at 19.
118. Rachel Awan, “Native American Oral Traditional Evidence in American Courts: Reliable
Evidence or Useless Myth?” (2014) 118:3 Penn St L Rev 697 at 703.
119. Ibid at 704.
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Studies have con¿rmed that Aboriginal oral histories provide reliable
accounts of history, displaying few differences from anthropological,
archaeological, or historical conclusions.120 Geographers have bene¿ted
immensely from Aboriginal oral histories, for example.121 Oral histories
have validated earthquakes along the coast of the Paci¿c Northwest from
hundreds of years ago and provided geographers and historiographers with
additional information about the impacts of these earthquakes on humans.
Additionally, the fact that oral stories may contain references to terms
that are not in written treaties does not mean that those references are
inaccurate. Instead, they may be representations by Crown of¿cials during
negotiations, which the Crown decided to not write down for its own
advantageous strategic purposes.122
However, in making distinctions between precise historical accuracy
and generalized events, courts have viewed Aboriginal oral stories as
primarily describing generalized events and group opinions. This does not
suf¿ciently respect Aboriginal peoples’ oral stories as reliable or authentic
and differs from using them to ascertain the truth about actual facts and
events.
&RQFOXVLRQJUHDWHUDFFHSWDQFHRIRUDOKLVWRU\HYLGHQFHLVIXQGDPHQWDO
WRUHFRQFLOLDWLRQ
Evidence law has become increasingly Àexible in incorporating Aboriginal
peoples’ oral history. Oral history evidence is typically accepted as
admissible and it has great weight when there is no contradictory
documentary evidence brought by the government or the opposing party.
Courts have af¿rmed that corroborative external evidence is not required to
give it weight and that to maintain a Àexible approach towards oral history
is essential to holding governments accountable in Aboriginal rights cases.
In addition, the process for accepting oral history evidence in Aboriginal
title cases is relatively informal and does not require a YRLUGLUH.
However, overall, to achieve long-term, meaningful reconciliation
between Aboriginal peoples and non-Aboriginal peoples, oral history
should be given more weight by the courts. The adversarial system
presupposes that parties have relatively equal bargaining power, but this
is not true in most Aboriginal rights claims. The state has vast resources
compared to most Aboriginal claimants. Thus, to favour written documents
over oral history when they conÀict only multiplies the unfairness within
the system. Moreover, courts should not be so quick to reframe cases as
120. Milward, VXSUD note 114 at 288.
121. ,ELG at 309.
122. ,ELG at 289.
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requiring precise historical accuracy to reduce the weight of oral history
evidence. Furthermore, they should not rely on experts like Dr. von Gernet
who contend that oral history evidence is unreliable without external
corroborative evidence. This is exactly what courts have rejected after
'HOJDPXXNZ, at least in principle.
University of Victoria Law Professor, David Milward, proposes several
other solutions to these problems including the education of judges on the
accuracy and reliability of oral history evidence, increased judicial notice
of historical facts and geography, expanded inference for treaty terms
not in the text of the treaty, and appointing more independent experts.123
In particular, court-appointed experts could have an open dialogue with
Aboriginal oral historians to move towards the truth. They would also
avoid the problems associated with partisan experts who have interests
to advocate for the party that is paying their fees.124 However, experts
selected by the court should be open-minded and aware of the legitimacy
and reliability of oral history evidence. Furthermore, judicial education
could include more than just basic seminars organized by the National
Judicial Institute of Canada on Aboriginal law, which include oral history
evidence as small components.125 Inviting Aboriginal law scholars to lead
the seminars is a positive step. Incorporating Aboriginal lawyers and elders
to speak about their experiences would also provide necessary context for
and knowledge regarding the consistent tests for accuracy of oral stories
in Aboriginal communities.
Successful Aboriginal title claims, such as 7VLOKTRW¶LQ, are critical
to reconciliation. They help to change the narrative and facilitate the
reimagination of the Canadian system. Underlying reconciliation is
mutual respect. This involves breaking down Eurocentric notions about
Aboriginal peoples. It also implies greater respect for and deference to oral
history evidence within the courts.

123. Milward, VXSUD note 114 at 288-289.
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